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Economic Risk Analys7-s" 
I.. :> .. 
When American Airlines evaluated STO~ Transpofts, we 
received 13 proposal~ for our ~tate-of-the-art-tec~Qology 
. , .. 
propelled STOL Transport (PST) that could be available 
';.' ~ " .. \.~ 
by 1975. We evaluated t~e~e, cut the list back to 3 
" . 
. "; 
airplanes on which we did a detailed risk a~alys7-s. lt 
.. 
, 
is this risk analysis l'm goin? to talk about today 1 
. .' . 
'!' . 
The studies that have been made br various people on 
market demand and modal split did not provide the in-
, ~' 
formation that American needed, because they started off 
.. 
" ,. 
.-.' 
with qssumtions that people would pay a certain fave 
" 
premium for STOL, and then calculated the size of the 
market. American had no doubts whatever that there was 
"j. 
a large market. Their question was, "Would passengers 
pay a STOL premium fare?" The real question was com-
.-. 
pletely opposite from the data that was provided. 
,," .; .. ' 
Furthermqre we wanted to look at specific rather than 
, 
hypothetical areas and hypothetical airplanes, because 
we were afraid that you would end up with hypothetical 
,,' . 
people and hypothetical profits that way. We felt that 
.. ~ . 
" 
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~TOL was necessary in the New york area because the de-
mand was f6r the city center operation rather than for 
an RTOL operation at the suburban airports. Further-
more We had reasoh to believe that you could put a city 
ceritet STOLpbrt in Manhattan, although not in Chelsea. 
The Chelsea reaction was not because it was a city center 
STOLpbrt. but be~ause it was a residential STOLport. 
There is an area at Hunters Point, on the East River 
(Queens) that is not a residential area and could Be 
eXpected to have no community reaction against a S'IOL.port. 
We l60ked at the market share: I'll explain later how We 
got this. Whete we had numbers with a fair amount of 
confidence. we used thOse numbers. Where there was un~ 
certainty we used a probability analysis. For instance. 
we determined a most likely value for the O&D market. a 
pessimistic value and an optimistic value. In the anal-
ysis .Sd% of the da.ta came from the most likely level, 
l~/o from the pessimistic and 10% from the optimistic. 
We looked at tHe spares cost in a similar probablistic 
fash:ilon·. Other uncertain economic ractors were the size 
of the O&D market, the direct operating cost. and the in-
direct operatihg costs. Values of which we were confident 
or' were fixed values were fare levels. the available seat 
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miles, offered, the aircraft cost, the aircraft resale 
value, the investment t~"credit rate and the interest - , " 
rate. We assumed 50% eq~ity, and financing for 50% at 
a 10% interest rate. These were fully allocated costs. 
We developed the internal rate of return on investment:· 
We used internal rate of return because we felt it was 
jRore representative of the actual profit and 10$S 'of 
the operation. 
., 
The usufl measure, return on invest- " .f : 
ment, hC\s to assume a certain depreciation rate of tl)e 
, 
aircraft, but internal rate of return is a function of ' 
discounteq cash flow. It tells you whether you afe mak": 
ing profits this year or next year and is therefore of 
more interest. We ran 3 fiirplanes (the Cal)adair Cr,-~46, 
' .. 
the McDol)ell 188 and the Degavilland DHC-7) through the 
computer 100 times each, qn a MQnte CariQ~i~k analysi~. 
Monte Carlo is a type of gambling procedur~'wher~t~~; 
.. , 1.. 
computer. wi th randoIl)., acce~s selects values that you 
give it. It can select these values with 'certain pro-
babil~ties. In .this case it was directed to select BOr., 
'. •• e··" " •• I'. 
; ,of the O&D share out, of the most likely value and 10% 
., 
'·H .. ·· .,' 
out of each of the pessimisb.c and optimistic. You' 
,'1' 
never know whether it is going to pick a number f~6m;' 
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the topllere and the bottom there or something else, but 
in the. long ~un you end up with a probability distribution 
which· shows that. the probability of making a certain ex-
pectedinternal rate of ret.urn is predictable. The'lO%' 
bound indicated that 90% of the cases were above this 
value and therefore there was a 90% probability of makihg 
this level of internal rate of return, or better. We 
Plotted a ~ean and the 10th and 90th percentile. This 
was plotted versus fare premium over CTOL, and number of 
seats offered. 
Now, I will discuss some of the input functions. 
There was a typical mission profile. You start the en-
gine in Washington. There was a fixed climb and man-
euver td get on the flight path below 1500 feet, then 
climb and cruise, a 5 minute hola at 5000 feet which was 
a delay factor built in, and then landing at New York.' 
There was a ld minute time in New york, no refueling, 
just ch~nge passengers, and takeoff, and climb. And 
return to Washinton, five minutes hold and either de-
scend ana land or divdrt. There was a half hour spent bn 
the' ground he.re to service the. airplane for the round 
trip. The total non-cruise allowances were 10 minutes 
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regardless of where you flew. The i~itial assumption 
wa's that there would be two STOLports ij'l Manl'\attan, one 
downtown STOLport and one in the suburbs. Immediately it 
was discovered that since no one really wanted to gp to the 
suburbs the airplanes would be empty, and thorefore the 
STOL airplane would have to d~adhead over to the suburban 
SroQLport. Even if it is a 10 ~inute flight over there, 
if you have a 10 minute system time, it becomes a 20 ~in-
ute flight to the other STQLport. If the time from WashT 
ington to New York was roughly 40 minutes of ~lyingplus 
10 minutes system time, or a 50 minute total flight, and 
if we add the other 20 minutes deadhead, the total is 70 
minutes of cost time but only 40 minutes of revenue time, 
this is right back where we started now with the 70 min-
.' " .. 
ute block time scale for B-727s between New York and 
Washington. Thus we assumed that there would only be 
one city center STOLport in New York and one in Washi~g-
ton. The range is 180 nautical miles between New York 
•• 
an~ Washing~on. We set up a sChedule with these airplanes 
by chasing tail members back and forth between New York 
and Washington. We assumed that there would be no market 
sensitivity due to ~he frequency because the frequencies 
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were from every half hour, every 20 minutes, every 15 min-
utes and every 10 minutes; and because of this very high 
frequency no one really cared whether they missed one 
airplane or not. 
We calculated realistic block speeds, realistic winds 
and temperatures for takeoff and landing performance. 
The ground distance each way was 180 nautical miles. We 
used the highest speed cruise because fuel cost was of 
no consequence; time was more valuable. The 85% pro-
bability winds for the winter and for the summer were khown. 
Because of the effect of winds on cruise performance ,you 
, 
do not subtract 24 knots if you are going downwind, you 
can only subtract a certain portion of it. There's a 
Boeing analysis that we used for this. We ended up with 
equivalent air distances. These then are reflected in 
the times. For the DHC-7, the block time was 70 
minutes (and this inciudes the 10 minute system time) 
from New York to Washington and 59 minutes fIDm Wash-
ingtbn tci New York. We used the winter winds beoause 
this is conservative, providing the greater cycle time. 
If you lodk at the actual times, then the DHC~7 \0[) uld 
depart from the Washington STOLport and it would arrive 
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~n New york City 59 minutes later. It has to stay on the 
ground a minimum of 10 minutes. It ended up staying.on 
the ground 11 minutes here which was fine. Now, ~f it 
had arrived at 61 minutes instead of 59 minutes, it would 
have had to stay on the ground a whole cycle and,could not 
have left at 70 minutes, for example; it wo~ld have to 
wai t over. Similarly, it ended back at. Washington a,fter 
140 minutes elapsed time, 30 minutes later it cou~d leave 
at 170 minutes. If this happened to turn out to be 9 
o' clock for example, it could leave at 9: 30ancl it would 
'be the 9: 30 flight. If it happened to arrivf;l at 9:05, 
it could not leave at 9:30, it would have to leave at 10 
o'clock, so there wa,s wasted time. This shows the .effect 
that just a small difference in cruise speed cap. have ,on 
the value of an airplane in its productive, time and utili-
zation. This is quite important. 
Looking at the market, we tried to. <;l.etermino;! wh~r;e the 
market was coming from. We did not assume any market 
generation or any market stimulatiop.. we figured that 
from New Jersey, roughly 25% of the people would .fly from 
Newark, perhaps 25% of the people would keep going to 
LaGuardia. No one was going to go out to Kennedy to fly 
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to Washington; but 50% would probably go to the STOLport 
in Manhattan. From Manhattan we figured no one would go 
to Newark) 10% to La Guardia, none to Kennedy, but 90% 
would go to the STOLport in Manhattan B.nd so on across. 
Remember, 90% is the probable value. Looking at the op .... 
timistic value everyone in Manhattan would go to the 
STOLport, and pessimisticaily only 2/3 would go. We did a 
, 
similar thing for the Washington area and when we got 
through) we added these things up. Furthermore, based 
9Il the market data, more people fly frcm New York dOwn 
to Washington then go from Washington up to New York. 
Perhaps, this is ;,ecause in Washington we say if you want 
to talk to us, come in and see us. At any rate, we fig~ 
ured 2/3 of the people were originating from Manhattan 
and only 1/3 from Washington, and so this means that we 
ended up with about 60% of the people who wanted to fly 
using the STOLports, optimistically 70% and pessimist- . 
ically only 43%. 
The Pan Am fare sensitivity assum:/=,tion input into 
the CAB Norhteast cOrridor VTOL investigation says that 
STOL wili capture 83% of the market at a CTOL fare but 
.only 45% Of the market at a C'l'OL fare plus a $'7.00 
premium. We did not necessarily agree with this but we 
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did not have anything better to use, so we used it. ~f 
you extrapolate historical market data you will find that 
in 1975, supposedly 4 million people will be flying be-
tween New York and Washington. American was a little more 
oenservative than that. Th<;ly said inst~ad of using thi~ 
9% growth rate we will use a 4% growt.h rate. We pre-
dicted 2.8 million. Now, at the 83% penetrat:\.on that .would 
move the probable STOL to 2.3 million at a CTOL fare. 
Using the data from above about who would actu~1ly go 
to the STOLports for the mean dropped it down to 60%. 
we have the optimistic case and the pessimisti9 case 
alsoo 
Market assessment is a pretty slippery thing t9 get 
nold of,. but using the fare sensi ti vi ty then we could· 
~etermine the size of the market vs. the people who pay 
the ·fare. There is another factor here which we did not put 
~n. That was the inelasticity because of cqnvenience. 
Plilople may pay a $ ~, $4 or $6 prl'!mium to save .some time. 
We ignored this to be conservative. Also, this is just 
the air fare which does not take into consideration any 
savings which the traveller might have from higher cab 
fares. going to airports further away. 
5.33 
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Looking at the costs, .we used the CAB in 1970 dol-;-
lars. We did not look at 1975 dollars because we felt 
that. if you.:3tart looking at 1975, you have to figure out 
I)ot only the inflation and the cost but also the in-
creased air fares themselves and then what is the dollar_ 
worth then to the t.J;-aveler. We felt that if it could 
be made profi~able in 1970, then it would be similarily 
profitable in 1975. 
We did no·t use American Airlines' usual overhead 
burden. We set this ,up as .either a subsidiary airline Or 
a separate airline entirely. The STOL costs had no 
bearing on the American Airlines costs other than just as 
a point of departure. The pilots' salaries are conserva-
tive in that they are the levels of the BAC-lll pilots, 
which wbuld be high for a DHC-7. We felt that if the 
source ·of the pilots was American Airlines, the pilot 
would have to make at least as much salary as he was 
making already. On direct maintenance, we did not ac-
cept the numbers of the manufacturer. Instead, our main-
tenance people looked at the airplane, system by system, 
and cbmpared it to the Electra on which we had operational 
data and determined the relative complexity. This then 
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gave them a basis on which they Cbulde·si,tlnatethe di-, 
rect maintenance and maintenance labor o'v'erhEj'ad;· 
On depreCfation;we'''did 'not 'u'sethe CAB rate but esti-
mated how 1bnii we cciuld 'use the 'aifp'l'ane" and' "what woul&' 
they be worth whei'nwe sold it.: ::We' felt that ·ifthe'sea,ir-
planes we're'availa1ble in197S,-they wOu1d'have "a useful·' 
l,ife of only" S years, 'becau'sE! we 'would have to 'sell1them 
as soon as 'the jet STOI.' s"came 'in-,Ifor; c6iitp'etitivereas0l'ls. 
We felt thatthe'DHC-7-would "have;a': very hi'gh'resale val-
ue' based 'on' ,the' TwiriOtter, exp'erience and wi th dipCtissions 
with 3rd level operators'and'sb; 'we'J$e!'J!t that a'S :ye'ar 
depreciation to '5"0% was reascinablEi - fot, that, airplane. 
: That approximated' the-CAB 'allowance! for: <1';4 engirie:tur" 
bo prop "of '12' 'yearel"'t6 S%.': On the 'other 'ai':!:cr1l'fti,: how-
ever,because they 'are more"complex" 'the'3:r:'d 'h:lveds',l: '; 
could riot be"counted ·bn 'to buy them.' ''lllie'market'there 
wOlildbe inSotithAmerieanc!duntrlE!s 'where'.'they;need':an" 
aircraft that -has' highperf6rmance fdr"bperaticin'in 'the. 
'l1IOilntaini3 and we felt that: ·arriil'lion and a half was-all,: 
these 'pebple"coula'affdifd;" Those "aircraft were ,tae :-".j 
"IiicDOHeIl le8~'ahd- theCana:dair "CV:' 246:: ,~, 'They were '·dejS"re,,:,: 
:ciii'ted, iri'S:'years' t6;1~ fuilliori dcllhirs,-which:was a" , 
535 
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variable rate depending on their initial cost, but was 
roughly double the CAB rate. 
Now this was not what you normally see for DOC, 
this was ~ash DOC because· this is cash flow accounting. 
The depreciation is added later so the total of $353/ 
block hour is not the total DOC. You have to add the 
depreciation, which varies from 130 to 137 dollars/block 
hour for the DHC-7, depending on its utilization. uti-
li~ation varied because we were flying on different fre-
quencies. YoU could add the cash DOC and depreciation for 
a total DOC of roughly $500/ hour. 
Looking·at the indirect operating costs. this is an 
annual cost, not per hour. There are certain things that 
are a function of just getting started. The stewardess 
ttaining for example, and the advertising and publicity. 
Our marketing people felt that it took quite a bit of 
advertising to let anybody know you are around, so there was 
a big initial effort. For the recurring cost, some 
things were fixed, some things were a function of the round 
trips per day and the number of passengers per aircraft. 
We came up then with an indirect operating cost in dollars 
per year in a formula to which we added a 10')(, contingeI1<.!Y 
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factor. These factors were all figured out based on the 
specific type of operation that was being considered. 
For example, ,with the food, there were savings because we 
w~re only toading one end. The type of service providep. 
was not meal service but rather liquor, which would be' 
sold, and soft drinks and coffee; very austere service. 
~urthermore, a savings was realized because there was no 
\ 
~aggage checking. If you provide baggage checking for one 
then you must have someone there to handle all of the 
baggage and you then have the whole system. There 
~ould be room on the airplane for someone to put his 
bag, but no baggage checking. Landing fees were based 
on an analysis of STOLports which we had made and f~~t 
that a 65¢ per passenger was reasonable. 
What did all of this come up to be? Looking at 
the internal rate of return as a function of the annual 
seats and the flight frequency, it looked like Figure 10. 
The numbers in parentheses are the load factors. We res-
tricted load factors to greater than 45% and less than 80'(0 ,/' 
~O% is a little high, but the American Airlines' Jet 
~ress averuge load factor between New York and Washington 
is 70%. We felt that sinc'e this was running back and 
forth, and since we had tIte option with this high frequel¥=Y 
537 
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of cutting out a flight, or a round trip at off peak 
times, we could maintain a ~igher load factor. 80% was 
the cutoff point. The value of the internal rate of 
rioiturn·(IRR) that you see is ,a little bit higher than 
you see normally for return o~ investment (ROI). ROI 
is not directly relatable and,not really convertible. 
If'you have a 10 to 12% ROI you might say that that is 
:t01ighly equivalent to maybe 24 or 26% IRR, but you hilve 
to be cautious because it is not really the same thing. 
Note that the size of the market varies and that we have 
airplanes of different sizes in here competing in a way. 
This method of analysis was able to handle this. Figure 11 
i~ the internal rate of return vs. the fare premium. 
T~ere is a 10th percentile line probability of making 
at least this return on the investment. The large spread 
was caused by the fact that there was considerable var-
iation in the pessimistic and optimistic values that were 
·put into the analysis .. The little numbers in parentheses 
are thelbad factors, 44% up ,to 74%. This shows that 
even with ,the conservative costs, the DHC-7 had a 90% 
. , "'probabili ty of breaking ~ven at a CTOL fare. This is 
quite interesting. If.you charge a little fare premium 
then you can make more but it starts dropping off at 
-14'-
a higher level. The question comes up of course then. 
what happens if you cut fares; does IRR continue to in~ 
crease? This would of course be interesting. Figure 11 
shows the data for the DHC-7. The CL-246 was above this 
and the McDonell 188 was below this. This was mainl¥ 
caused by the input costs for the airplanes. 
Now this is where the economic analysis stops but 
that is not where the decision process stops. because 
other factors enter into it. The McDonnell 188 and CL~246 
could not go into production on the basis of this one mar-
keto These airplanes will not be available because there 
is not enough justification. The DHC-7 is likely to ~o 
into production and therefore could be available. but thts 
is not the size of airplane nor the image that America~ Air-
lines wanted to get involved in. If you put on a very con~ 
servative hat and look at the return on investments and 
the money that is already obligated for DCIOs and the 
B-747s. it just does not make sense to buy a prop ai~-
plane. Therefore. the decision was made to terminate 
further study of the propeller STOL transport and con-
centrate on maintaining the option for jet STOL oper-
ation when it is available in the '80's. If I were a 
5~q 
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regional carrier, or someone who can offer this type of 
airplane, I think that the airplane would work and be 
very good. At American Airlines it did not work for us 
and so I recommended against. 
The next step would be to look at a jet STOL trans-
port and run through this same type of analysis. The 
prop airplanes were small, they were too small xorthe 
market. The jet STOL would be a much better size. 
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PST DtRECT OPERATING COST· 
(1970 $ @ 200 n. mi. Stag-a, Length~ 
. i DHC-i I I 
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Flying Operations I I ') pilots 82 "-Fuel & Oil ,. 33 
Insurance (@ $7.70 per 
$ mil flyaway cost) 17 
5200 = Direct Maintenance 106 
(60% labor) 
5300 = Maintenance Burden 115 
(1.8 x maint. labor) 
7000 
-
Depreciation and 
Amortization ~ =-~ <-.:-= 
Total Cash DOC 
-
$/block hour 353 
Note: Depreciation was added separately during the risk analysis 
since it was a function of aircraft u·tilization. It varied 
from $130/IL H. to). $137 lB. H. for·theDHC-7· ' 
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5500 -
Stewardesses 
Stew. Tr.a1ning 
Stew. Uniforms 
Pax Food 
Pax SuppUes 
6100 -
Aircraft Servlcing 
Landing Fees 
Facilities Costs 
6200 -
Traffic Handling 
6300 -
Servlcing Admin. 
6500 -
Res. & Sales 
661)0 • 
Mv. & PubUc:ity 
6800 • 
G&A {Public L-iabiHty) 
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l'ST INDIRECT OPERAT:JNG tOST 
(Annual Cost in 1970$) 
One tilne 
2,460 (R. T .) 
day 
350,000 
$35tl,OOO+ 
$2,460(R.T.) 
day 
I 
Fixed 
29,150 
5;040 
62,000 
35,000 
Recurring {add 
f(R.T.) 
day 
6,730 
409 
3,660 
107. contingency) 
f(R.T.) (Pax) 
day air<:raft 
206.50 
111.30 
_ 429.00 
1M.00 
184.50 
67.40 
$131,190 - $10,7-99{R.T.)-$1l67 30(R.T~){Pax) 
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CAPAC ITY OFFERED AT TWO LEVELS OF Fi\RE PREM lurvi AND MARKET SIZE 
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0.5 
90% 
load Factor -%~ 
t-70' 
10% 
= 
Passengers' = 890,000 
PST FMe ~ 
ClOL Fare + $7 ~ 
~PSlFare = ClOL Fare + $0 90% _ = .. ~ Passengers = 1,630,000 
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DHC-7 VARIATION IN IRR AND ITS RISK WITH CHANGES IN FARE PREMIUM 
(Available Seats Fixed at 2,040,000 Annually) 
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